Historically, development has not been at the core of the multilateral trade regime. The multilateral trade system did not incorporate development concerns until the Doha Development round, which paradoxically has since its launching in 2001 contained the seed of its own failure, given the focus on development it was supposed to embrace. This chapter looks at the major aspects of the trading system and its relations to development. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) evolved over time in its treatment of developing countries, changing the use of special and differential treatment (S&D). An imbalance in rule making became evident with
Introduction
The development literature has placed a strong focus on the role of the trade policy regime in growth, and more broadly on the link between liberalization and growth. Country performance in relation to these issues has been the subject of controversy for well over a century. The debate on whether trade was a handmaiden or an engine of growth was an analytical one before it became increasingly fact-based from the late 1960s onwards, when developing countries were first subjected to intensive scrutiny in the heat of the center-periphery debates. This essay will not touch on the debate but review the road taken in a stylized fashion. The aim here is not to elaborate on any of these vast and complex topics, but rather to show interconnectedness as well as the most significant ways in which the trade regime has acted and reacted to the evolution of ideas on development.
Global trade was worth almost fifteen trillion U.S. dollars in 2011. This figure represented almost a third of global production, a comparison that is meant to show the relevance of trade for development. Thus traditionally, developing countries have sought differential and more favorable treatment in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/Word Trade Organization Round after round of negotiations delivered meager benefits for developing countries.
Liberalization remained largely restricted to the large scale operations of industrial countries (Tussie 1988) . In 1955 the trade in manufactured products among developed countries had accounted for a third of world trade; by the end of the 1960s this had risen to nearly half. No efforts were made to tackle the issues of trade in primary products. The panoply of tariffs and nontariff barriers on primary products posed severe obstacles for other countries to develop downstream processing. Subsidies ballooned after the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Economic Community (EEC) came into being in the 1960s.
1 As subsidies grew unabated, prices were pushed downwards and the developed countries were able to surpass the developing countries in the value of primary product exports. By 1969, developed countries' share of world trade had reached over 80 percent.
This paper looks at the major aspects of the trading system and its relations to development. The first section addresses how the GATT evolved in its treatment of developing countries. The second section analyzes how the use of special and differential treatment (S&D) has changed over the years. The third section addresses how the imbalance in rule making became evident with the results of the Uruguay Round agreements and its implementation costs. The fourth
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Chapter 48 Page 7 section addresses how the debate has moved from the concept of S&D to the discussion of policy space. Finally, we conclude with some reflections about the current governance challenges the WTO faces today.
The early years
From the day the GATT was established, developing countries emphasized the uniqueness of their development problems and challenges and their need to be treated differently. However, the system did not take into account their development needs except for granting them a list of exceptions that was systematized under the S&D treatment until the late 1970s.
The GATT revision of 1954-55 marked the first time provisions were adopted to address the needs of developing countries as a group. Three main provisions were adopted, two of them related to Article XVIII reflecting the argument that developing countries would be more prone to face balance of payment instability over an extended period of time; Article XVIII B was revised to include a specific provision to allow countries at "an early stage of their development" to adopt quantitative restrictions on imports whenever monetary reserves were deemed to be inadequate in terms of the country's long term development strategy. At the same time, restrictions) to support infant industries. In 1961 the GATT adopted the Declaration on the Promotion of Trade of Less Developed Countries, which called for preferences in market access for developing countries not covered by preferential tariff systems such as Commonwealth.
In 1964, Part IV of the GATT-entitled "Trade and Development" was adopted-providing a specific legal framework for developing countries. This Part IV includes three new articles.
Article XXXVI established that parties should provide "in the largest possible measure more favorable and acceptable market access conditions for products of export interest to developing countries" (particularly primary products and processed goods), while stipulating at the same time that developing countries should not be expected to make contributions inconsistent with their level of development. In addition, Articles XXXVII and XXXVIII called for improved market access for products of export interest to developing countries.
In sum, a pattern evolved in these early years in which on the one hand the GATT accommodated developing countries' desires not to liberalize their import regimes based on infant industry grounds and balance of payments reasons, but on the other hand failed to take action on questions of market access to developed countries as well as commodity price stabilization. The but not to negotiate legal commitments in their favor, as many developing countries were not part of the GATT or participated only minimally in its deliberations. Developing countries did not see the GATT as a primary forum to debate their trade concerns; during those years they lobbied instead at the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
With UNCTAD's support, developing countries succeeded in establishing the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which essentially provides an exemption from the most favored nation principle (MFN), with the purpose of lowering tariffs for developing countries on a basis of voluntary preferences granted by developed countries. Among other concerns, developing countries claimed that MFN was creating a disincentive for richer countries to reduce and eliminate tariffs and other trade restrictions that could benefit developing countries. In 1971, the GATT issued an official waiver that permitted developed countries to grant tariff preferences to developing countries for an initial ten-year period, and another waiver allowing developing countries to grant preferences among themselves. The main argument for this system was that reductions in industrial tariffs in previous rounds of negotiations were not particularly beneficial for developing countries, as most of the products of export interest to them were not covered by the negotiations. This exemption later evolved into the concept of special and differential treatment (S&D) analyzed in the following section.
Rise and fall of special and differential treatment
By the late seventies, import substitution provided declining returns in terms of growth and many of its premises came under siege in development circles. The marginalization of developing countries from international trade had concurrently given rise to an active campaign to reform the structure of the international trading system under the leadership of Raúl Prebisch (Dosman 2008) . From the UNCTAD which he created, he had advocated the principle of S&D for developing countries.
The first steps towards S&D-that is, asymmetrical treatment or non-reciprocity in international trading rules when they involved transactions between developed and developing countrieswere gradually inscribed toward the end of the 1960s to underscore the trade-development link.
It allowed positive discrimination for developing countries. S&D had first led to the drafting of Part IV of the GATT on trade and development, and subsequently to the more comprehensive "Enabling Clause" approved in 1979 during the Tokyo Round (Tussie 1988) .
The understanding of the meaning of S&D was clarified and written into the fifth provision of the Enabling Clause: "Developed contracting parties shall therefore not seek, neither shall lessdeveloped contracting parties be required to make, concessions that are inconsistent with the latter's development, financial and trade needs." 2 The main development of this principle was the creation in 1968 of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and its implementation in the early 1970s by major industrial countries, based on the waiver to the MFN principle for the GSP approved in 1971. However, the GSP did not turn out as planned: a generalized (as its name indicates) system of preferences subject to multilateral supervision. As far as market access, studies soon indicated that its effects were rather frustrating. Thus, for example, Karsenty and Laird (1987) showed that in 1983 the GSP had increased developing country exports by only two percent, with half of those benefits going to the Asian Tigers and Brazil (Whalley 1990) .
As for what leeway was allowed to protect their own markets, S&D manifested as benign neglect in terms of ensuring that developing countries' domestic policies conformed to tight regulations.
Until the Uruguay Round (1986-94), developing countries were able to keep most of the tariffs unbound at high levels, to use quantitative import restrictions and other mechanisms of trade intervention. Developing countries were also left out of the loop of the codes of conduct on export subsidies, import licenses and other issues. Drache correctly concludes that asymmetry in the acceptance of rules paradoxically became the institutions' default option (Drache 2011) . In practice, the "development dimensions" of the global trading system continued to be a bone of contention.
A key factor in the global environment all through the 1980s was, of course, the change of perception in the development debates about the virtues of import substitution versus export-led growth. In the orthodox interpretation that gradually gained ground, protection was increasingly viewed not only as leading to inefficient allocation of resources but also as a source of the "anti- In any case, and leaving aside the conceptual debate on development policies, it was increasingly clear that those developing countries that relied on export-led growth now had a growing interest in a better multilateral trading order per se. It also meant that industrial countries increasingly saw them as competitors, and were thus reluctant to grant them S&D. Turning the tables, developed countries now called for a "level playing field" (Bhagwati 1995) .
New rules, novel concerns, fresh approaches

Imbalanced rules
Despite the cumulative efforts countries made to play by the rules and accept blanket obligations, they came out sorely disappointed. Countries soon learned that acceptance of the rules of the game (including their own liberalization) did not translate automatically into leverage, as they found it difficult to decisively influence the process of agenda setting and to shape the final outcome of negotiations. Over the first decade and a half of the WTO, while the call for a level playing field gained ground, developing countries made efforts to put forward technically substantive negotiating positions, no longer accepting the WTO principles, rules, and processes uncritically.
First, they showed how the rules and outcomes of negotiations were imbalanced against their interests. The expansion of the agenda under the Uruguay Round, through the introduction of the then new issues, made the system even more imbalanced, as well as constraining of the domestic policy space as the system moved from its traditional concern with trade barriers at the border to
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issues involving domestic economic and development strategies and policies. Many developing countries have complained that the benefits they anticipated have not materialized, particularly in the area of agriculture. While developing countries reduced tariffs, increased bindings, and agreed to tighten rules on intellectual property and get rid of export subsidies, they did not gain much in terms of improved market access.
In agriculture, even after reduction by 36 percent, which was the set obligation, in order to retain room to maneuver, many products ended up with higher levels of protection than applied prior to the Uruguay Round. For example, the following ad valorem tariffs were identified by the European Union (EU) as base rates: rice 361 percent, wheat 156 percent, sugar 297 percent, meat 125 percent, and dairy products 288 percent (Hathaway and Ingco 1995) . Subsidies on agricultural products were "bound," i.e., could not be increased beyond the specified level, but binding levels were strikingly generous in the amount of water included over and above the leeway to change from restricted to unrestricted categories (the notorious "blue box") 3 and other such loopholes. The following are estimated figures of public support to farmers: in Japan, US$23,000 per farmer; in the EU, US$20,000 per farmer; and in the USA, US$16,000
per farmer.
58 percent of the total value of production, and in the European Union and the United States 35 percent and 21 percent respectively. In short, there was meager agricultural liberalization and in many cases there was room for retrogression (Meller 2003) . Japan, Iceland, Norway, the Republic of Korea, and Switzerland are among the countries with the highest level of subsidies, and the EU also exceeds the average of the OECD. In some cases, as subsidies shifted from one crop to another the redistribution has actually broken the rules. Thus, in a dispute settlement case involving cotton, the U.S. was found to have wrongly shielded some trade-distorting subsidies within the category of non-trade-distorting, 4 hence permitting subsidies (the so-called Green Box); it was asked to change its policies accordingly.
The developing countries had expected to benefit significantly from the Uruguay Round through increased access to the markets of developed countries for products. This was especially true in agriculture and textiles, sectors in which developing countries have a comparative advantage.
These two sectors remained those subject to the highest levels of protection in industrial countries. Tariff peaks continued to be an embedded feature of the system, particularly in these two sectors, and continued to affect in particular developing country exports. About three-fifths of total imports into industrial economies of tariffs that exceed 15 percent (which represent
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Developed countries' subsidies are partly redundant from the point of view of their domestic markets, to the extent that tariff and non-tariff protection make domestic consumers pay higher prices. This is why the computable general equilibrium simulations mentioned above indicate that the relevant issue from the point of view of liberalizing agriculture is actually market access, particularly tariff rates applied beyond the minimum quota of market access. However, developing countries are affected by subsidies in two ways. First, they have to compete with subsidized agricultural goods in their own markets. In this regard, even the full elimination of export subsidies, as proposed during the Doha Round of negotiations, may hardly solve the problem, so long as production subsidies equally allow producers to sell below production costs.
Second, developing countries lose export opportunities in third markets. This is particularly true of cotton, where world market distortions are essentially generated by production subsidies in the U.S. (Khor and Ocampo 2011) .
Tariff escalation by industrial countries retained substantial loading against imports from developing countries. Much more important for development strategy were the provisions on minimum rights for owners of intellectual property, and to establish national enforcement mechanisms. Under these provisions the pharmaceutical industry was able to hold back on making valuable drugs available to developing countries. In the case of Argentina it has been estimated that rents of $425 million per year may have been transferred from domestic to international pharmaceutical industries (Nogués 2005) . The right to other policy instruments was also narrowed down and challenged in WTO committees and the dispute settlement mechanism:
price bands 5 and simplified drawback schemes (in Chile), price reference system for imports (in Uruguay), export credits (in Brazil), and regional subsidies for tobacco and port development (in Argentina), among others. An underlying reason for the imbalanced outcome was that negotiations were not used to open foreign markets, but as a means of locking in reforms. In this context of enfeebled bargaining power, the world of ever growing continuous negotiations strengthened essential asymmetries, subjecting developing countries to disciplines from which they had previously been exempt. Negotiations often turned out to be opportunities for a combination of structural adjustment packages along a comparative advantage pattern.
The implementation problems were the second thrust of the link between trade and development. After the Seattle fiasco, the developing countries made the negotiations on resolving implementation issues their top priority. They asked for priority solutions to these concerns, and
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wanted to defer proposals of the developed countries for introducing yet more new areas (the Singapore issues) into the WTO mandate. However, the developed countries made it clear they
were not interested in discussing the implementation issues, which to them were the result of previous negotiations (the Uruguay Round) whose outcome had already been agreed on. They wanted to push ahead instead with injecting new issues into the WTO.
In the aftermath of 9/11, when the Doha Ministerial Conference was convened, the developing countries held a strong bargaining position and so succeeded in placing implementation-related concerns in four areas of the Ministerial Declaration that launched the Doha Work Programme:
Firstly, a separate Doha Ministerial decision on implementation-related issues and concerns was adopted, 7 which addressed several of the problems faced by members. However, the more important and difficult issues remained unresolved, and although this document is supposed to contain decisions to resolve problems, in fact many of them merely refer the particular matter to some WTO body or other for further discussion. Despite the prominence given to implementation at Doha, however, those issues were subsequently pushed out of sight. As awareness on implementation costs grew, countries resisted all proposals from developed countries to negotiate the introduction of still newer agreements or rules in the WTO, firstly on labor standards and secondly on the "Singapore issues." The latter is a set of issues (investment, competition policy, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation) that the developed countries introduced at the WTO's first ministerial meeting held in Singapore in 1996. If accepted as the subject of new rules, these issues would have greatly expanded the mandate of the WTO. Since 1996, these issues have bounced back and forth in the WTO's negotiating process.
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The stalemate between the two camps reached a record high at the Ministerial Conference in Cancun in October 2003. The meeting collapsed, and the list of proposals compiled and submitted by developing countries also went down the drain. The trade and development issues then took a new turn in terms of substance and process, as we shall now review.
Space for development policy
Of equal or greater relevance to implementation are the constraints imposed on their policy space to implement development-oriented measures such as promotion of local industries or adoption of new technologies. The changeover from the GATT to the WTO substantially altered the range of available development policies (DiCaprio and Gallagher 2006) . In addition to imposing disciplines on a wider range of activities, the WTO was also better equipped than the GATT to enforce compliance given the change in the Dispute Settlement agreement.
The agreement on subsidies allowed developed countries a free hand with their own subsidies (e.g., for research and development, regional development, and environmental adaptation) but . However, they also agree that certain policy space is still available for active public development policies.
As S&D was seen to be a losing battle while at the same time a new balance of global economic power began to emerge, the focus of the debate shifted to policy space for development policies.
Some economists, including Rodrik and Stiglitz, have proposed a much more proactive role for economic policies. This may be interpreted as suggesting that developing countries could increase their current policy space only by opting out of at least some of their international commitments. Moreover, Rodrik (2007) argues that developing countries should embrace an alternative view of the world trade system in which the centrality of trade has to be questioned, particularly because a development-friendly international trade regime cannot exclusively focus on improving poor countries' access to developed countries' markets. Instead, the focus should be on experimenting with institutional arrangements and leaving room for them to devise their own solutions to the problems or poverty traps they face. 
Governance
Finally, although WTO governance brought improvements in relation to the GATT, its decision making process also came under fire for not allowing meaningful participation of developing countries. This was especially so in the earlier years of the WTO, during which the major developed countries were able to leave out the developing countries that complained about the decision making process, especially during Ministerial Conferences where the most important resolutions are adopted.
After the Particularly remarkable was the rise within the WTO of a "G20 developing countries" centered on Brazil and India. 8 Following in the footsteps of the Cairns Group, the G20 was set up just before the Cancun Ministerial Conference in order to coordinate pressure on the EU and the U.S.
to reduce their import tariffs, export subsidies, and domestic support in agriculture. By then China was "dictating global prices for nearly everything from copper to microchips," since its Coalitions frequently come to operate across issues, and are bound by a collective idea that the developing world shares several problems and needs to address them collectively. But unlike the Chapter 48 Page 31
confrontation of the 1960s-70s for a new international economic order, the challenge mounted by these coalitions has not been accompanied by a call to replace the WTO with an alternative organization. Their mission is to inject momentum when it is lacking and to advance proposals for negotiations (in contradistinction to the attempt in the 1960s to establish the UNCTAD as a counter-alternative to the GATT). They have not fully advanced a vision of development alternative to the neo-liberal one, and the change that they have demanded is change within the WTO regime rather than radical restructuring. Members emphasize the importance of interests and the production of knowledge to press for these (Tussie 2009 ). Nonetheless, their tactics still show a strong policy commitment to distilling the issues of development and economic justice along North-South lines. There is actually no strong reason to dismiss these softer forms of associations as fickle because they allow members freedom of action and multiple allegiances from the onset.
To press the point just a bit further, in the world of negotiations coalitions continue their tasks.
But coalitions are not a matter of principle: they are formed for specific contextual reasons, in Unless an effort to deepen specializations is mustered, and over-reliance on a single engine of growth is tempered, dependence on a few commodities will intensify; countries will remain overexposed to trade shocks, and the inequality-generating forces of international asymmetries will hardly be tamed. This scenario poses even more questions on the current stalemate than the Doha development round currently faces, and tears apart old NorthSouth dichotomies, opening a space for a wider debate about what role development should play in the multilateral sphere.
Conclusion
All told, the important point in the new scenario is that for the most part it has been the technical specialists who have held center stage, either hired experts and consultants or professional policy-makers working for national governments. By definition, these specialists work within the established political parameters of an era. They strive for a compromise between the concerns of policy space and the technical power of institutionalized ideas; without the aspiration of delivering a new paradigm, they are smart, alert, and industrious. In the real world of negotiations this was a door that needed opening; it was not a leap across boundaries to a new development paradigm, but it has made inroads into the processes of global governance.
If we are to take up the development approach to trade we need to look at the complexities of international economic institutions and the negotiations that ensue from them. At the core of these negotiations lies the question of whether the current trade regime enables developing countries to design policies that promote development. This is not an easy subject. Many studies have shown that appropriately designed trade reforms have the potential to make a significant contribution to development, and, with appropriate parallel measures, to do so in a socially goals through the existing trade negotiating process.
For one, the Doha agenda did not change the multilateral process, only its stated goals.
Multilateral trade negotiations are not designed to deliver development. Their purpose has always been to maximize gains, and through a process of give and take, to move toward freer trade. To give real life to the development component, it may be necessary to reform the foundations of the negotiating process itself and to accept that "one size fits all" recipes have not produced a positive outcome in all developing countries. Most trade agreements have adopted development as a goal, but the bodies that negotiate them are not responsible for development, do not have the competence to define what sustainable development means, and are not subject to the requirements of any other authority except as provided through international law and other mechanisms of regional and global governance.
Moreover, while most of the literature addresses the correct sequence of policies and the timing for liberalizing trade, it does not address local conditions in depth. Negotiations are not paced or shaped in such a way as to allow timing and sequencing, nor do they take account of the concentration of economic power within countries. As well, academic knowledge is systematically disregarded by the realpolitik of world trade negotiations. Trade policy choices are path-dependent, and that is why a long-term and tailor-made approach to development that allows policy experimentation is so important. The implications for domestic bureaucracies are paramount, since development should be an integral long-term part of all phases of the decision making process, not an isolated goal stuck into an agreement. There is a disconnection between those in government who deal with the adjustment process and those in charge of the trade decision-making process. Attention needs to be paid to the decision-making process itself in order to better address the most significant regional and global issues that have been identified within trade and development linkages.
